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INSTITUTE 
OF 
Foroim Investment and Economic Growth: The Case of 
Hr . Newman. 
Newman's article seeks to illustrate the trade-offs which exist between 
domestic saving and foreign investment in the attainment of the targets for 
GUP in the Plans of the three East African countries. To do him justice, he 
never employs the term trade-offbut much of his discussion can be under-stood 
in no other way. 
Newman adopts virtually unaltered a model employed by Chenery and Bruno 
to analyse slightly different problems in the case of the Israeli economy. 
Unfortunately5 in modifying their approach, Newman leaves himself with in-
sufficient degrees of freedom. We might add that the whole issue aopears much 
more difficult than it is because of the confusing exposition of Newman in 
particular5 but also to some extent of Chenery and Bruno. 
C & B present a conventional model of simultaneous equations in a number 
of variables, which can be classified in a variety of ways. Apart from purely 
endogenous and exogenous variables, there are 'policy' variables which do not 
all possess the same status. Some are 'pure instrument variables' such as the 
exchange rate (r):. and the net foreign capital inflow (Fn). Others are 
'objective variables' such as the unemployment rate (u), and government 
recurrent expenditures (Gn). These are given fixed values and so become in a 
sense exogenous although u is allowed to vary as we shall see below. Some 
of these policy variables might in other models be estimated directly as 
parameters of the sjrsten (e.g. the marginal savings ratio — s — in this model 
is the marginal propensity to save of the private & the government sectors and 
so is amenable to influence within institutional limits — although there is in 
fact no difficulty in crossing the lower limiting value of s). 
3 
The policy model is reduced to four equations 5 hypostasised as 
indicated in the parentheses following each. 
(13) Vn = f (u; 2.) (This is the full employment equilibrium condition 
is the rate of increase of labor productivity) 
(14) Vn = f~(Fn, s) (Savings = Investment Equilibrium) 
(15) Vn = fg (Fn, Gna En) (Balance of Payments Equilibrium) 
(16) (C H- G) (Total consumption)= (1 ~ s)Vn + (s-s)Vo 
1 Newman See p. 23, and p. 35 for particularly clear examples . 
2 (Chenery and Bruno, 1962). 
3 This word derives from the Greek ui+iiainvi • (huphistemi) - I drive out of 
(his9 her, its) minda which., readers should note takes the genitive. 
There are only two strictly endogenous variables remaining, Cn and Vn. 
There remain six policy variables ~ Uj £, Fn, s, Gn, En, (The case of En is 
somewhat anomalous. It is a function of export prices (exogenous) and the 
exchange rate, r. Since to each r there corresponds a level of exports, we can 
consider either r or E as policy determined, r also affects M (imports). In 
actually working the model, however, the authors leave r at a single value, and 
treat Exports as a policy variable, since exports depend "on other factors beside 
the exchange rate.11' 
As C & B point out,^ Equations (13)and (14) are analogous to a Harrod-Domar 
fixed coefficient production function :'If all the parameters are fixed,, the 
maximum rate of growth will be determined by one of the two equations, and either 
labor or capital will be in excess supply." Such an equation could be simply 
expressed as 
V = Min (aK, fjN) (where K = capital stock, and = labor supply). 
They further suggest' that the balance of payments equilibrium (15) expresses an 
analogous limitation on growth, so that we could write our equation as 
V =Min(aK, 0N. yM) (where level of imports = I'D. 
This idea is utilized, in a sense., later in the paper. But the authors' 
is 
real concern/with the values for the policy variables which simultaneously 
7 
satisfy equations (13 to (15). That is we can only make meaningful statements 
about situations where all equations of the-model are satisfied. 
There are four degrees of freedom in the system and six 'policy' variables, 
Clearly, if all six are exogenously set, the system will in general be over-
determined. In general we would have three values of Vn. If we assume, using 
our production function outlined above, that the lowest of these obtains, there 
must be unemployed resources in the other two markets. Say that Vn is determined 
by N, then we must have unemployed savings and unemployed foreign exchange and we 
would find ourselves trying to explain what forr^ s these take. 
C & B follow an alternative approach. They lay down a plausible range for 
the values which each policy variable might take, either for institutional or 
other reasons. In particular,, they fix Gn and u — although the latter is 
1 C 5 B, p. 92 
5 Ibid (p~. 85) 
6 (We are indebted to Dr. B. F. Massell, for pointing this out). 
7. Ibid C & B, (p. 91). 
allowed to vary from its desired level of 0.05 in :'several trial solutions.''"' 
With Gn and u fixed, the degrees-of freedom available are two. That is* we can 
fix values of any two of the remaining four policy var5_ables, and the system 
will determine the values of the remaining two as well as of the endogenous 
variables. However, this is not what C & B seem to do. 
To take one example of several. On p. 94, C & 3 pursue the implications of 
setting Fn=0 (initially, then at successively higher levels), En=l,150, 
£=0.03 (although it is later allowed to rise to 0.04), and, implicitly„s<0.165 . 
With Gn and u set, the system is apparently overdetermined. However, it is 
clear from Table IIQ that u and s in this case are allowed to vary in order to 
make (13) and (14) compatible with (15). What C 2c B in fact do is to set maximum 
values on En of 1,150 and on s of 0.165, and then find the largest Vn for 
increasing values of En. At first, En=l,150 provides the constraint and s<3.155. 
Later, (beyond Point 8), savings provide the constraint and En<1,150. The 
fulfillment of the labor market equilibrium (13) is treated somewhat differently. 
Below the Vn which corresponds to full emplojrment when labor productivity increases 
at its lowest plausible rate, unemployment is assumed to occur. At levels of 
Vn above this level, it is assumed that labor productivity increases just 
sufficiently to ensure full employment and no labor shortage, until £=0.04 is 
reached. Beyond that point, the employment equation provides the constraint for 
further increases in En, and s<0.165 and En<l,150. 
in1 ewman, in a simplified C & B model lacking the labor market equations, runs 
out of degrees of freedom. His policy model takes the form: 
(14) Vn = f2 (Fn, s) 
(15R) Vn = f (Fn) 
O n 
Ha hopes to use the model to exaninethe trade-offs between s and Fn in achieving 
the Plan target GNP, Vn". (Ey setting Vn=Vn", there is no need for the labor 
market equilibrium equation (13) in the C & B model. (15R) differs from the C & B 
(15) since Newman assumes that exports are exogenously determined.) Setting 
Vn=Vn" in (14) and (15R), and assuming some level of s, 
"We ..... have two estimates of the foreign capital inflow needed to attain 
the target, one provided by the savings constraint and one 3gy the balance 
of payments limitation. It follows that, for any target Vn", it will be 
the higher of these two estimates of Fn which will actually be needed to 
reach full success."^ 
8 (C & B d". 93) ' - -
9 Ibid. (P. 34) 
10 Newman"(p. 30-1) 
_ 4 _ 
For example, if in the case of Kenya c=20.0,the Fn implied by (14) when 
Vn=Vn* is £38.1 million, whereas Fn implied by (15R) is £23.6 million. In this 
situation, Newman would say that Fn must equal 38.1 'to reach full success'. 
But he has no instrument variable in (15R) which can be varied in order to 
render the two equations compatible with each other. The only thing which can 
'give' in this model is 's1, and so the level of Fn determined by (15R) will 
always be the one which obtains. 
Were C j, E doing the Newman exercise, they undoubtedly would have left one 
more degree of freedom in the system by leaving En as a policy variable in (15). 
In this event, we would have a choice between s and Fn, given Vn s due to our 
ability to vary En. 
We may summarize the above remarks briefly. Understanding the Chenery and 
Bruno article is difficult because the authors neglect to state explicitly what 
assumptions they are making at each point. Understanding Newman's article is 
difficult because he does not seem to have understood the nature of his model? 
I"1 or the Chenery and Bruno piece? or the nature of simultaneous equation systems? 
ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF THE ABOVE NOTE' 
In the Chenery and Bruno article from which Newman draws his model, the 
authors search out solutions of an apparently over-determined model by allowing 
several variables to take on different values without explicit notice so long 
as the values of those variables remain within specified limits. In Newman's 
adaptation of the C & B model, there are insufficient decrees of freedom to permit 
this to happen. The result is that Newman's numerical results are correct, but 
his discussion of what they mean is totally misleading. 
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